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Abstract 
 This article develops a conceptual framework to explain the economic rationales underpinning the 
choice of different modes of governance of formal university-industry interactions: personal contractual 
interactions, where the contract regulating the collaboration involves a firm and an individual academic 
researcher, and institutional interactions, where the relationship between the firm and the academic is mediated 
by the university. Although institutional interactions, for numerous reasons, have become more important, both 
governance modes are currently being implemented; we would argue that they have some important specificities 
that need to be understood if university-industry knowledge transfer is to be managed effectively and efficiently. 
 
Keywords: University-industry interactions, governance modes, knowledge transfer, academic consulting, 
transaction costs, appropriability.  




Since the 1980s, in most advanced economies, views about the role of universities in 
the economic system have changed. The contemporary university is an economic organization 
that engages actively with external stakeholders, rather than an ‘ivory tower’ where 
academics perform research in isolation. The term ‘university-industry knowledge transfer’ 
refers to a wide range of interactions at different levels, involving the exchange of knowledge 
and technology between universities and firms. These interactions are varied and growing. 
They include, among other things: various types of equity or contract-based relationships 
between universities and industry (research joint ventures, collaborative research projects, 
contract research and academic consulting commissioned by industry); interactions around the 
commercialization of intellectual property rights emerging from university research (licensing 
and purchase of university patents, creation of start-up firms); and employment-based 
interactions (joint training and supervision of graduates, graduate recruitment and personnel 
exchanges) (Debackere, 2004; D’Este and Patel, 2007).  
From the perspective of the universities, these activities are often described as ‘third 
stream’ or ‘third mission’. Their scale and scope have increased in parallel with the increasing 
importance given to them by policymakers and the business and academic communities: 
measured effects of the more intense engagement of universities with external stakeholders 
include increased numbers of papers co-authored with industry (Hicks and Hamilton, 1999), 
increased industry funding for academic research (Slaughter and Rhoades, 1996; Geuna, 
1999), more university-assigned patents (Henderson et al., 1998; Geuna and Nesta, 2006) and 
increased income from royalties (Argyres and Liebeskind, 1998; Feller, 1990; AUTM, 2002).  
This article examines the rationales underpinning the different modes of governance 
of formal interactions between university and industry which involve a formalized agreement 
among the participants with respect to the division of labour and the rules for joint decisions 
and assignment of outputs. The traditional mode of governance of formal interactions 
between academia and industry — in some contexts dating back to the late nineteenth century 
(Meyer-Thurow, 1982; Liebenau, 1984; Swann, 1989; MacGarvie and Furman, 2005) — 
implies a direct contract between a firm and an individual academic scientist. We call this the 
personal contractual mode of interaction. Over time, however, the number of collaborations 
                                                 
1This article is an abridged and radically developed version of: Isabel Maria Bodas Freitas, Aldo Geuna and 
Federica Rossi (2011) ‘University-industry interactions: the unresolved puzzle’ in C. Antonelli (ed.) Handbook 
on the Economic Complexity of Technological Change, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
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involving contractual arrangements between a firm and a university (e.g., the university 
department, research centre, technology transfer office, etc.) has increased steadily. We call 
this the institutional agreement mode of interaction.2 
In many countries, this qualitative shift in the governance of interactions between 
industry and academia has taken place in parallel with the development of an institutional 
infrastructure intended to support the diffusion of knowledge from universities to firms 
(Block, 2008; Geuna and Muscio, 2009). This infrastructure now comprises a variety of 
organizational forms which include university-industry liaison offices, technology licensing 
offices, technology transfer offices, joint industry-university research centres, academic spin-
offs, technology consultancies (Peters and Etzkowitz, 1990; Cohen et al., 2002; Rothaermel 
and Thursby, 2005; Link et al., 2007). Some of these organizational forms, such as university-
industry technology transfer offices, date back to at least the mid-twentieth century and have 
increased in importance; other organizational arrangements are more innovative, for example 
the creation of limited partnerships between universities and private companies (Feller, 1990). 
There is a large and growing literature investigating numerous aspects of university-
industry interactions (recent discussions of the main research topics can be found in D’Este 
and Iammarino, 2010;Rothaermel et al., 2007; Wang and Shapira, 2010; and for the Italian 
case, Muscio, 2010), but comparative analyses of the two modes of governance described 
above are rather scarce. The modes of governance tend to be studied in isolation: most studies 
focus on the institutional mode, and only a few try to analyse the characteristics of direct 
personal interactions, focusing generally on academic consulting, which often is mediated by 
universities. Problems such as the rationale for the use of each governance mode, the effect of 
each mode on the efficiency of knowledge transfer and on processes of economic 
development, and whether the two governance modes are complementary or substitutes for 
each other, have been rather overlooked.  
This article focuses on the economic rationales underpinning the choices of 
governance mode. It develops a conceptual framework that explains the reasons for choosing 
a particular mode of governance, in terms of minimizing different types of transaction costs, 
and presents some supporting quantitative evidence. The data were collected from two 
original surveys addressed respectively to a sample of firms based in the Italian region of 
Piedmont (UIPIE survey) and a sample of inventors working in the same region (PIEMINV 
                                                 
2Another trend, not explored in this paper, is the progressive increase in the number and importance of the 
interactions between firms and universities, compared to the relative decline in importance, since the 1990s, of 
the interactions between firms and public research centres. The existence of such a trend has been noted for 
many European countries, including Ireland, Denmark, the UK, Iceland, Italy and Hungary (Senker et al., 1999), 
although notably not Germany (Senker et al., 1999). 
 4
survey). Data from the same region provide the complementary perspectives of managers and 
inventors on both types of governance of industry interactions with universities. 
This article is organized in three main sections. Section 2 contextualizes and 
introduces the two governance modes (sub-section 2.1) and the reasons for the relatively few 
comparative analyses (sub-section 2.2). A conceptual framework is developed to explain the 
specificities and reasons for the continuing coexistence of the two governance modes (sub-
section 2.3). Section 3 presents some empirical evidence supporting this framework, which 
shows that several firm and project characteristics are associated with the modes of 
governance of formal university-industry interactions. Section 4 concludes and discusses 
some policy implications. 
 
2. Two modes of governance of formal university-industry interaction 
2.1. Formal university-industry interactions: Context and characteristics 
Since the 1980s, industrial research and development (R&D) processes have become 
more open and distributed (Chesbrough, 2003; Powell and Grodal, 2005; Nesta and Saviotti, 
2006) and the involvement of universities as innovation partners has increased. Several 
processes have combined to make interaction between firms and universities more appealing 
for both parties. 
From the perspective of firms, the growing complexity of products and processes and 
their scientific and technological content (Arora and Gambardella, 1994) increases the costs 
of vertically integrating all the competences needed for their development and makes it more 
convenient for firms to look for complementary competences outside their boundaries. 
Interacting with universities allows firms to access wide international networks of scientists 
with heterogeneous competences and opportunities to establish relationships with the 
potential to generate innovations (Antonelli, 2008). 
The increased pace of organizational and technological change generates uncertainties 
about the economic context in general, and the likely development of technological 
trajectories and the emergence of dominant designs in particular. By building relationships 
with other organizations, especially universities, firms can hedge against the risk of backing 
the ‘wrong’ technology, by engaging in several innovation processes at the same time (Powell 
et al., 1996; Wang and von Tunzelmann, 2000), and at a fraction of the cost of fully vertically 
integrated R&D activities. They can keep up to date with scientific developments (Meyer-
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Kramer and Schmoch, 1998) and enhance their learning and research opportunities by 
accessing advanced infrastructures and very qualified human resources. 
Interactions with universities are particularly cost effective for firms. The economics 
of knowledge shows that the costs of knowledge production in academic are lower than in the 
private research system because of the split structure of academic salaries (Dasgupta and 
David, 1994): university researchers’ fixed costs are covered by the payments received for 
their teaching activities, so that ‘the compensation schemes practiced in the academic system 
allow the supply side to operate on a variable cost base’ (Antonelli, 2008, p. 12). Also, a 
university affiliation signals quality and competence, based upon the institution’s reputation 
in the open science system, which is an independent system that confirms the competence of 
academic researchers, lowers firms’ search costs for high-quality competences, and reduces 
the agency problems inherent in collaborations with knowledge workers whose skills are 
difficult to assess (Antonelli, 2008).  
From the universities’ perspective, the developments in science-based technologies 
make industrial collaborations important for individual academic scientists to test models, and 
to access funds, and production and testing facilities (Koumpis and Pavitt, 1999; Lee, 2000). 
University institutions have become more proactive at seeking collaborations with firms 
because political trends are forcing them to find ways to reduce their dependence on public 
grants. These trends include reduced funding for university defence research and reduced 
government intervention in the economy, (Geuna and Muscio, 2009). Policy interventions are 
encouraging universities to engage in third stream activities and are highlighting the role and 
importance of institutional interactions with industry and supporting the creation of an 
institutional infrastructure for knowledge transfer between universities and firms (Macdonald, 
2010). Examples of these interventions include the creation of publicly-funded regional 
knowledge transfer organizations in Germany, joint university-business competence centres in 
Sweden (Sellenthin, 2006) and support for the adoption of model contracts for university-
industry collaboration in the UK (HM Treasury, 2003). As a result, third stream activities 
have become increasingly important for universities as a direct source of funds derived from 
commercial transactions and as a means of acquiring visibility and legitimacy and providing 
benchmarks for policymakers to measure their effectiveness (see, e.g. the UK Lambert 
Review, HM Treasury, 2003). 
The greater engagement of universities in third stream activities brings some 
problems. The literature highlights such issues as the possible effects of increased dependence 
on private funding on the direction and content of research activity and the autonomy of the 
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scientific enterprise, and on the functioning of the open science system. Universities’ 
engagement in commercial transactions may have negative effects on firms’ innovation 
processes by putting the parties into direct competition, which may result in universities 
restricting access to scientific information making it more difficult for firms to appropriate the 
results of collaborative research with universities. 
A possible side effect of the increased participation in third stream activities could be 
the replacement of more traditional forms of interaction with industry based on direct 
personal contractual relationships with academic researchers, by interactions mediated by an 
institutional knowledge transfer infrastructure. While some (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 
2000; Gibbons et al., 1994) argue that the supposedly more efficient new institutional 
knowledge transfer model is substituting for the older model and should be developed further, 
we would suggest that there are important differences between the two models that are not 
related to whether an individual academic or a representative of the university is signing the 
contract. The two models of governance have different histories, characteristics and economic 
implications (Geuna and Muscio, 2009) and, potentially, play different roles in the knowledge 
transfer process. 
Personal contractual interactions involve an official contract between an academic and 
a firm. These interactions are often described as academic consultancies, and the individual 
scientist is hired to work as an external consultant on a firm project. The firm organizes and 
monitors project activities, which means that the firm retains control over the scope and 
organization of the project, but also has to bear the project coordination costs. Also, because 
the scientist working on the project is a self-employed, external consultant, monitoring the 
work is relatively costly for the firm because of high agency costs. 
Much of the empirical research overlooks this type of university-industry interaction, 
concentrating instead on analysing the interactions, even in consulting activities, mediated by 
the university structure. This in part is because generally it is easier to collect this type of 
data, as we discuss in the next subsection, but it is also because the nature of personal 
contractual interactions is often misunderstood. It is often assumed that most interactions with 
individual academics are informal and, hence, difficult to measure and that, even if they are 
formalized, they involve ‘soft’ topics such as the application of business methods or the 
solution of simple day-to-day business problems (see e.g. HM Treasury, 2003; Bercovitz and 
Feldman, 2005). However, studies that explicitly consider formal academic consulting 
activity as a distinct knowledge transfer channel highlight its importance (see e.g. Rebne, 
1989; Cohen et al., 2002; Beath et al., 2003; Perkmann and Walsh, 2008; Jensen et al., 2010) 
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and suggest that consulting includes a wide range of activities linked to the exploitation of 
existing knowledge, the commercialization of research results and the performance of original 
research (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008; Dechenaux et al., 2007). 
Personal contractual interactions traditionally played a major part in knowledge 
transfer from academia to industry. There is evidence of significant interactions between 
companies and university scientists in the late nineteenth century in Germany and England, 
and in the early twentieth century in America. In Europe, these interactions continued to 
constitute the main share of university-industry collaborations throughout the twentieth 
century. The absence of formal business networks involving industry and academia meant 
that these interactions usually built on social networks (often based on a common educational 
background, as in the case of alumni associations) involving academic researchers and their 
industry counterparts and were characterized by high levels of interpersonal trust (Colyvas et 
al., 2002). The freedom of academics to contract with external organizations enabled these 
personal contractual interactions, which in most contexts, were tolerated or regulated by 
specifying the number of hours per month that an academic could devote to external 
consulting activities.3 
As universities came under increasing pressure to intensify their knowledge transfer 
activity in order to procure funding and to demonstrate excellence in knowledge 
dissemination (a criterion used more and more by public funding agencies to assess university 
performance), academics were encouraged by their institutions to abandon personal contracts 
in favour of university-mediated arrangements. One of the arguments used by the university is 
that a formal arrangement insures the academic involved for any damage resulting from the 
performance of the contracted work. Institutional contracts are signed by the firm and a 
university representative. The scope and content of the project and the rules regarding the 
assignment of rights over the intellectual property emerging from the project, are often 
negotiated by the parties, but the coordination costs of organizing and monitoring project 
activities are shared. Also, since the scientist works on the project as a university employee, 
monitoring his/her work could be relatively less costly for the firm. Although many 
institutional interactions are based on personal friendships between academics and the 
commissioning firms, knowledge transfer offices are becoming proactive in looking for 
potential partner firms.  
                                                 
3
 Academic consulting activities are also often mediated by the university institution, which channels consulting 
income through its accounts and may apply overheads (Beath et al., 2003; Perkmann et al., 2009). The personal 
contractual interactions examined in this paper are formal (contract-based) agreements between individual 
academics and firms, which are different from university-mediated consultancy activities and consultancy based 
on informal personal relationships. 
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Both governance modes are current and we argue that it is important to understand 
their differences in order to develop an effective and efficient knowledge transfer 
infrastructure.  
 
2.2. Conceptual and measurement problems in the analysis of university-industry 
interactions 
Although there is a large body of research on the characteristics of university-industry 
interactions,4 there are very few investigations of which governance form is most effective to 
mediate specific knowledge transfer interactions. There is also a lack of consensus on the 
most appropriate mechanisms for knowledge transfer between universities and industry. One 
of the reasons for this lack of agreement is that most studies that try to capture the complex 
phenomenon of university-industry relationships relying on different measures and data that 
are not comparable, resulting in major inconsistencies..  
Several empirical studies use data collected through surveys of academics or/and 
firms, that take account of a wide range of alternative knowledge transfer channels. There is a 
recognition that several channels may be exploited simultaneously, and that formal channels 
allowing commercialization of university knowledge (i.e. spin offs, licences, patents) are 
among the least frequent (Schartinger et al., 2001; Cohen et al., 2002; D’Este and Patel, 2007; 
Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 2008). According to Bruneel et al. (2009), conference attendance 
and graduate recruitment constitute the main forms of firm interaction with universities, while 
Abreu et al. (2008) suggest that the most frequent interaction occurs within collaborative 
research networks. D’Este and Perkmann (2007) find that, in the UK, collaborative research 
projects, including consultancies, are more important sources of income than licensing. 
Schartinger et al. (2001) highlight crucial inter-sectoral and inter-disciplinary differences in 
the intensity with which the different channels are used. Because of their broad focus, these 
studies provide little evidence on the governance of formal interactions and on the relative 
importance of difference governance forms. 
In addition, knowledge transfer channels are categorized in different ways. For 
example, Perkmann and Walsh (2006) propose a distinction between socialized and non-
socialized interactions, that is, between interactions that involve the establishment of social 
relationships (sponsored research projects, research consortia, collaborative joint ventures, 
                                                 
4
 See, among others, the Special Issues of Industrial and Corporate Change 16(4), 2007, Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 23(4), 2007 and Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 63(4), 2007. 
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research centres) and those that are purely contractual (licensing, specific ad-hoc 
consultancy). Others indicate that all knowledge transfer channels - including those based on 
the sharing of codified knowledge, such as access to scientific publications and university 
patent licensing - are accompanied by the establishment of social relationships (Meyer-
Kramer and Schmoch, 1998; Bozeman et al., 1995). 
Most studies are based on one-off survey data or internal university information that is 
not standardized across universities. Evidence from different surveys is not always 
comparable due to respondent and sample biases. The results from comparing the responses 
from firm managers, R&D managers and inventors are often divergent (e.g., company 
researchers are usually more likely than firm managers to consider university research to be 
an important source of knowledge for firms). The survey design can also introduce bias. For 
example, the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) divides sources of knowledge into 
universities, scientific publications and conferences: however, this classification not only 
neglects many channels of knowledge transfer from universities that are discussed in the 
literature, it also introduces a downward bias in the ranking of the importance of university 
knowledge (the overall importance of university knowledge should be measured as the sum of 
the knowledge directly obtained from universities and the knowledge obtained from scientific 
publications and conferences). Moreover, since the CIS and similar surveys focus on 
capturing innovation-related activities, this orients respondents to focus on business-related, 
accountable, ‘concrete’ types of activities and sources, and usually results in comparative bias 
(i.e., respondents tend to rank the most concrete sources of knowledge as most important, and 
understate the importance of interactions such as personal contractual arrangements that 
involve individual collaborators rather than a partner organization). 
Finally, when, as is most often the case, studies rely on data made available by 
university technology/knowledge transfer offices, they capture only the set of interactions 
managed directly by the university (see, e.g., Joly and Mangematin, 1996; Thursby et al., 
2001). Policy often considers only statistics related to ‘university and other higher education 
institutions’, overlooking the fact that individual academic researchers may be active players 
in the interactions with industry. 
Hence, although work on identifying knowledge transfer channels has become quite 
sophisticated, it has several limitations when the focus is on comparing different modes of 




2.3. A conceptual framework to explain the rationales for different forms of interactions 
Interaction arrangements seem to reflect the concerns about and motivations for 
collaborating (Foray and Steinmueller, 2003). There is evidence suggesting that the 
governance of an interaction is associated with different perceived levels of transactions costs 
and uncertainty involved, and the aims of the collaboration (Artz and Brush, 2000; Zang et 
al., 2007).  
Several authors consider that different modes of governance of inter-organizational 
interactions should apply in the presence of different levels of transaction costs. Gulati and 
Sing (1998) show that coordination costs, which depend on the expected complexity of the 
activities to be undertaken and the expected interdependence of tasks across organizational 
boundaries, can be high and efforts to reduce these costs may influence the firm’s choice of 
which governance form to adopt. Interactions in which project control and coordination costs 
are shared are argued to be more appropriate for contexts where the need for coordination, 
integration and processing of diverse information relative to diverse subtasks, is high. Gulati 
and Sing suggest that this applies particularly in highly complex technological projects. On 
the other hand, if coordination costs are low they can be more easily managed by one or other 
of the partners. Appropriability considerations also play a role in the choice of governance 
form, with ‘shared’ governance structures being more relevant in conditions of weak 
appropriability, which carry a higher risk of opportunistic behaviour such as free riding. Other 
things being equal, trust between the partners reduces the risks of opportunism (Williamson, 
1975) and the need for shared coordination. 
Another type of transaction cost that affects interaction is the cost of monitoring the 
degree of commitment of partners. According to Lacetera (2009), outsourcing to an academic 
institution increases the commitment of research scientists to the project because it is 
conducted according to the norms of the scientific community and within realistic timescales, 
which reduces monitoring. The higher the potential monitoring costs, the more relevant a 
form of governance that allows scientists to operate within the framework of their academic 
institution.  
These insights apply to the choice of governance mode for university-industry 
interaction. Since the content of the project around which the interaction is developed 
influences the extent of the transaction costs (especially coordination and monitoring costs), 
we would argue that certain governance modes are more appropriate for certain types of 
projects. Projects related to basic scientific knowledge have high coordination costs, since (i) 
they involve high fixed costs and require the contribution of teams of researchers rather than 
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of individuals, and (ii) they are characterized by high levels of codification of results, 
uncertainty in terms of possible application, and externalities related to the range of possible 
beneficiaries (Nelson, 1959), all of which leads to low appropriability (Arrow, 1962). These 
types of projects tend also to involve high monitoring costs because the research is complex 
and open ended, and monitoring the efforts and commitment of scientists is difficult. Based 
on these arguments, such projects are suited to institutional contracts which allow the firm to 
participate in the governance of the collaboration, which reduces coordination costs and 
ensures researchers’ commitment because they are operating within the framework of their 
scientific institution.  
Applied research projects, on the other hand, produce knowledge that is more 
immediately appropriable by the firm and because the research is more short-term and closer 
to the firm’s activities, project activities and monitoring of university scientists’ commitment 
is easier for the firm. According to the arguments presented above, these types of projects are 
better suited to personal contractual governance.  
Consistent with this framework, Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch (1998) in a survey of 
professors in different academic fields in Germany found that ‘collaborative research’ 
(typically involving the university institution) is more important in microelectronics, software 
and biotechnology, where research is more ‘basic’, and that ‘contract research’ (which 
includes academic consulting) is relatively more important in production technology, a field 
that is strongly oriented towards applied R&D.  
As different firms tend to have involvement in different types of innovation projects, 
we expect the two modes of governance to differ across firms with different characteristics. In 
a companion paper (Bodas Freitas et al., 2010) we analyse in more detail the firm 
characteristics associated with the choice of governance mode. Firms with high levels of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) will be more likely to benefit from more 
basic research projects, which are uncertain, but enhance their research productivity and allow 
unexpected technological spillovers, which they will be better able to detect and eventually 
benefit from (Fontana et al., 2006; Laursen et al., 2011). Other things being equal, we would 
expect firms with high levels of absorptive capacity to be more likely to engage in 
institutional interactions. 
Firms may favour different forms of governance depending upon the resources 
available for cooperative activities. Small firms generally do not have excess resources 
(financial, managerial skills, cognitive abilities) to deal with cognitively and socially distant 
institutions such as universities, and find it difficult to initiate and organize university-firm 
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collaboration. We would expect small firms to be more likely to interact through personal 
contracts with individual academics.  
Firms that rely on sourcing technology from external organizations (via 
collaborations, licensing of intellectual property, etc.) are more likely to have the capabilities 
required to search for knowledge providers, and their search costs will be lower for personal 
contractual interactions. They may be part of a network of trusted academics which whom 
they have collaborated in the past, which reduces coordination and monitoring costs. They 
may be more likely to have the technological and codification capabilities to enable them to 
write ‘water-tight’ contracts. Therefore, all else being equal, we would expect such firms to 
be more likely to engage in personal contractual interactions. 
The policy framework also matters for firms’ choices of governance models for 
university-industry interactions: for example, public funds to support university to industry 
knowledge transfer that are restricted to university-mediated interactions may be an important 
determinant of the firm’s choice to set up an institutional collaboration. In countries where 
policies to support the institutional model are recent, e.g. Italy, we would expect both models 
of governance of university-industry relationships to exist, and respond to different 
knowledge exchange needs. Section 3 provides some evidence of the co-existence of these 
two modes of interaction in the Piedmont region of Italy, and discusses several determinants 
of the relative use of the two models, within the framework presented in Section 2.3. 
 
3. Modes of governance of university-industry interaction: Empirical evidence 
This section provides some evidence on the relative importance of the two modes of 
governance of university-industry interaction described above. We rely on data from two 
original surveys conducted in 2008-2009, addressed respectively to firms and inventors, all of 
whom are based in the Piedmont region in north-west Italy. In other words, their institutional, 
social and economic settings are identical. This is important because it allows us to control for 
some of the determinants of different types of interactions and analyse whether the two 
models of governance are complementary or substitutes for the organization of university-
industry interactions in the same regional economic system. 
Based on data from the UIPIE survey5 of Piedmontese firms (Bodas Freitas et al., 
2010), Table 1 reports the shares of firms that engaged in institutional interactions with 
                                                 
5
 The UIPIE questionnaire was administered in autumn 2008 to a representative sample of 1,058 firms in the 
Piedmont region; we obtained 1,052 valid responses. The sample was developed and validated by the local 
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universities, that engaged only in personal contractual interactions with individual university 
researchers and firms that did not interact at all during the period 2006-2008. 
 
Table 1. Co-existence of governance mode for university-industry interactions (firms) 
 Observations Share (%) 
Sample 1,052 100 
No institutional interaction 865 82.2 
Institutional interaction 104 9.9 
Personal interaction but no institutional interaction 83 7.9 
Source: UIPIE survey 
Based on data from the PIEMINV survey of Piedmontese inventors,6 Table 2 presents 
the shares of inventors and the channels of knowledge-transfer under different governance 
modes (shares are computed using the 945 inventors that responded to the questionnaire).  
                                                                                                                                                        
chamber of commerce, which sent out our questionnaires with their quarterly regional economic foresight 
survey. 
6
 The PIEMINV questionnaire was administered in autumn 2009 and spring 2010, to the population of inventors 
with a Piedmont address, that had applied for a patent to the European Patent Office (EPO) in the period 1998-
2005 (about 4,000 patents and 3,000 inventors in Piedmont). We obtained 945 valid responses from 2,583 
questionnaires sent (response rate 36%). 
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Table 2. Co-existence of governance mode for university-industry interactions 
(inventors) 
Source: PIEMINV survey  
 
The results of these two surveys are consistent in showing that personal contractual 
interactions are almost as frequent as institutional cooperation. Thus, an exclusive focus on 
the latter overlooks an important part of the phenomenon. The manager survey (Table 1) 
shows that in 2006-2008, 10 per cent of Piedmontese firms engaged in institutional 
interactions and 8 per cent in personal contractual interactions only (we do not know whether 
firms that participated in institutional interactions also engaged in personal contracts). Among 
the inventors surveyed (Table 2), about 28 per cent reported institutional interaction with a 




used but of little 
importance (%) 
used and very 
important 
(%) 
university-industry interactions    
• institutional  interactions financed by company 70.8 15.4 13.7 
• institutional  interactions financed by public 
funds 
72.6 15.0 12.3 
• personal contracts with individual academics 72.9 14.6 12.5 
• informal personal contacts 71.4 19.1 9.5 
‘open science’ channels:    
• scientific articles 38.5 26.2 35.3 
• conferences and scientific seminars 46.0 32.7 21.3 
• other publications 36.7 33.9 29.4 
‘commercial’ channels:    
• interactions with university TTOs 76.6 16.2 7.2 
• contacts with university spin offs 84.4 10.6 5.0 
• university patents 76.8 17.1 6.1 
• sharing facilities 80.5 11.5 8.0 
‘employment’ channels    
• company staff in university 94.7 4.4 0.9 
• university staff in company 80.5 12.3 7.3 
• student internships 62.1 24.0 13.9 
• hiring of graduates 57.6 21.1 21.3 
• joint supervision of graduate students 71.1 16.6 12.3 
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rather than firms (where the respondent is the manager) increases the importance and use of 
university research.  
Table 3 shows that there is a positive correlation between the use of different forms of 
governance of formal interactions. In other words, governance modes are not mutually 
exclusive. Firms may participate in interactions governed by different forms. This indicates 
that modes of governance can be associated with the different characteristics of the innovative 
projects.  
 




through public funds 
Personal contracts 




contacts between your 
company and 
university researchers 
institutional interactions financed by 
the company 0.544*** 0.417*** 0.321*** 
institutional interactions financed 
through public funds   0.417*** 0.355*** 
personal contracts between company 
and individual university researchers     0.382*** 
Note: *** Significance at 1% (2-tailed)  
Source: PIEMINV survey 
 
Table 4 uses information from the PIEMINV survey to show the effectiveness of 
institutional and personal contractual interactions for specific industrial knowledge 
development goals. Percentages are computed over the number of respondents that declared 
experience of institutional interactions with universities and personal contracts with 
individual university researchers. The results suggest that personal contractual interactions are 
particularly important for firms wanting to solve problems related to product development 
and production activities, and to identify students to recruit. In the case of non-competitive 
basic-research, institutional interaction is preferred or is at least as relevant as personal 
contractual arrangements. Both personal contractual and institutional interactions are used to 
update knowledge and to get new ideas for product development, although there is a bias 
towards personal contracts in the latter case. Hence, the choice of governance for contracts 
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with a university seems to be related to the type of knowledge being developed and shared. 
These results are broadly in line with the conceptual framework presented above, which 
proposes that projects oriented towards basic scientific knowledge development are more 
likely to be governed through institutional interactions and those oriented more to the 
application of scientific knowledge to the firm’s own products and production activities are 
more likely to be governed through personal contractual interactions.  
Hence, personal contractual interactions seem to be advantageous for immediate 
business activity because they provide access to the best graduates, and to ideas for new 
product development. Institutional interactions are preferred if the objective is to keep up to 
date on new knowledge developments, which reinforces the view that they involve projects 
where the knowledge exchanged is more general and less firm-specific. 
 
Table 4. Effectiveness of institutional and personal interactions with university 
according to the content of the project.  











Non-competitive (basic research) projects 32.2 21.3 34.2 
To keep up to date on new knowledge 
developments 
28.2 17.3 41.1 
Applied research projects to develop new 
products 
14.2 50.4 25.8 
Applied research projects for production 
Activities 
12.2 49.3 25.1 
To identify the best students for recruitment 20.7 42.2 26.9 
To get ideas for new product development 15.3 34.2 37.3 
Source: PIEMINV survey. Question: ‘In order to reach the following objectives, which is more effective: 
collaborations with a university or personal contracts with individual university staff?’ 
 
From the UIPIE survey, which was addressed to local firms rather than inventors, we 
can identify three distinct subsamples of firms: (1) those with only institutional interactions, 
(2) those with only personal contractual interactions, and (3) those with involvement in both 
modes of interaction. The data show that firm characteristics (and strategies) can play 
important roles. Table 5 provides some descriptive statistics of the differences between firms 
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that engaged in institutional interactions with a university, and those that used personal 
contractual interactions with individual university researchers, in the three years before the 
survey. 
 







n = 104 n = 83  





Food, Beverages and Tobacco 15.4 9.6  
Textiles, Apparel and Shoes 5.8 14.5 ** 
Wood and Furniture 1.9 4.8  
Paper, Printing and Publishing 4.8 2.4  
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics 17.3 9.6  
Production of Metals and Metal 
Goods 
12.5 15.7  
Mechanics 19.2 14.5  
Production of Electrical, 
Electronic and Communication 
Equipment 
6.7 12  
Production of Transportation 
Equipment 
6.7 4.8  
Other Manufacturing companies 9.6 12  
Total 100 100  
Size 
10-49 employees 36.5 71.1 *** 
50-249 employees 40.4 25.3 ** 
more than 250 employees 23.1 3.6 *** 
Total 100 100  
Turnover 
less than 2m 0 31.3 *** 
2-5m 1.9 20.5 *** 
5-10m 16.3 21.7  
10-20m 30.8 9.6 *** 
20-50m 41.3 9.6  
over 50m 9.6 7.2  
Total 100 100  
R&D or design 
investment 
Yes 58 41 *** 
No 42 59  
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Total 100 100  
Note: *** Significance at 1% (2-tailed), ** Significance at 5% (2-tailed); * Significance 10% (2-tailed) 
Source: UIPIE survey (Bodas Freitas et al., 2010) 
 
In line with the arguments presented in section 2.3, we find that larger firms with 
higher levels of absorptive capacity (proxied by investment in innovation through in-house 
R&D or design) are more likely to engage in institutional interaction with a university and 
that small firms are more likely to be involved in personal contractual collaborations only. 
Bodas Freitas et al. (2010) provide evidence that firms whose interactions with university are 
supported by personal contracts with university researchers tend to invest more than firms that 
collaborate institutionally in knowledge acquisition through patents and know-how, and are 
more likely to adopt ‘open’ innovation strategies based on the exchange of technological 
knowledge with external partners than firms that do not collaborate at all. Thus, contractual 
personal interactions with specific university researchers seem to play a role in the absorption 
of externally acquired knowledge and in the integration of knowledge and know-how 
developed in collaboration with other partners. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This article proposed a conceptual framework to explain the rationales underpinning 
different forms of governance of formal university-industry interactions. We focused on direct 
university-industry interactions — personal contractual and institutional — rather than purely 
commercial relationships based on the exchange of intellectual property or personnel and 
student exchanges.  
We have argued that formal university-industry collaborations can be governed by 
personal or institutional contracts, and that the choice of the mode of governance is related to 
the knowledge content of the project. Following Gulati and Singh (1998) and Lacetera (2009), 
we showed that for shared governance, institutional interaction is more appropriate when 
coordination and monitoring costs are high and appropriability conditions are weak, which is 
typical of projects developed around basic scientific knowledge. More ‘unilateral’ forms of 
governance, such as personal contractual collaborations, are more appropriate for projects 
characterized by lower coordination and monitoring costs and high appropriability conditions, 
typical of projects developed around applied knowledge. We argued also that firm 
characteristics affect the specific form of governance chosen to manage the interactions: 
larger firms and firms with higher levels of absorptive capacity are more likely to engage in 
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institutional interactions, while smaller firms and firms more reliant on the acquisition of 
external knowledge which favour more open innovation strategies based on the exchange of 
technological knowledge with external partners, are more likely to engage in personal 
contractual interactions. 
Our data, collected from surveys of R&D managers and inventors in Piedmont, 
suggest that personal contractual interactions are as important as institutional arrangements 
and that both are complemented by informal contacts. The evidence on science-technology 
interactions in the Piedmont region broadly supports the conceptual framework outlined, and 
shows that institutional governance may be more effective for innovation projects with a high 
basic research content and conversely, that personal contractual arrangements seem to be 
effective for innovation projects concerted with mainly applied research and problem solving. 
Smaller firms, especially those that employ open innovation strategies, are more likely to 
favour personal contractual interactions, while large firms with high absorptive capacity are 
more likely to engage in institutional contracts. 
This study has important implications for policy makers. Both personal contractual 
and institutional governance models are important for collaboration and knowledge transfer 
between university and industry, with personal arrangements more appropriate for small 
companies. These results are somewhat paradoxical since most policy support for the 
development of institutional forms of governance of university-industry relationships is based 
on the belief that academia is unable to respond to the applied knowledge needs of small 
companies. Instead, personal contractual interactions with individual academics, which do not 
directly involve the university, appear to be more effective in facilitating the transfer of 
knowledge especially to small firms, and providing firms with knowledge relevant to their 
business, technology and production needs. 
Both personal contractual and institutional interactions need to be considered when 
examining the contribution of universities to economic development. Instead of focusing only 
on support for institutional interactions (which are often too cumbersome, too costly and too 
inflexible for small firms), policy should try to stimulate personal contractual interactions 
through appropriate regulation of part-time professorships and consulting. This would provide 
incentives for firms to organize contracts with individual academics when this form of 
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